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Alternative Practice Structures - An Analysis of How the Current Independence 
Rules for Auditors of Public Companies Might be Applied (An Addendum to Issue 
Summary 98-2)
Under the current independence rules, presumably written with only traditionally- 
structured accounting firms in mind, all “Members” (as defined), are precluded from 
having most loans to and from, and any direct or material indirect financial interest in, 
attest clients. In addition, in all but a few limited circumstances, auditors are precluded 
from providing bookkeeping and certain other services to public attest clients. Loans and 
direct financial interests, as well as the provision of certain services, are generally 
prohibited without regard to materiality under the current rules.
In general terms, a “Member” is defined as the firm, all of its partners, those providing 
professional services to the client, and those managerial employees in an office 
participating in a significant portion of the engagement.
Fundamental Concept
In trying to apply the current independence rules to alternative practice structures (APS), 
the fundamental question is whether one believes that the AttestFirm and PublicCo. are 
separate, independent operations.
If one were to look through the separate legal ownership of PublicCo. and AttestFirm, 
and the measures taken to separate effective control of AttestFirm from PublicCo. 
management and to enhance the individual identities of the two in the public’s eye, 
concluding that these efforts were (1) more form over substance, and that (2) the dual 
employment status of AttestFirm partners, and the administrative and employee leasing 
arrangements between PublicCo. and AttestFirm, effectively negate most of the 
separation and distinctness afforded by the legal structure of the two, then it seems that in 
applying the current rules, PublicCo. would be precluded from having loans to and from, 
and direct and material indirect financial interests in attest clients. In addition, PublicCo. 
could not perform bookkeeping and certain other services for attest clients, and could not 
have any of the business relationships or contingent fee arrangements with attest clients 
barred to traditional firms (i.e., PublicCo. would be deemed a “Member”). In 
determining the financial interests and other relationships, if any, that PublicCo. officers 
and employees could not have with AttestFirm clients, the definition of “Member” might 
also have to be further revised to describe those PublicCo. officers and employees that 
would be equivalent to the partners and managers of a traditional firm.
On the other hand, if one were to respect the legal separation and the measures intended 
to enhance the operational and distinctness of the two entities, believing that these efforts 
were effective in isolating the operations and control of AttestFirm, then you would not 
prohibit many relationships between PublicCo. and AttestFirm clients. Proponents of this 
view, however, concede that the dual employment status of AttestFirm partners poses 
some special risks to auditor independence. They would apply certain restrictions to 
PublicCo. and certain of its managers to protect the auditor from undue influence arising 
from his or her concurrent PublicCo. employment.
In addition, PublicCo. / AttestFirm relationships have been structured in different ways, 
and any application of the rules to these alternative practice structures would have to be 
adapted to fit the particular circumstances. For example, we understand that there have 
been instances where AttestFirm partners have joined PublicCo., severing their ties and 
financial relationships with AttestFirm, and leaving behind one or more partners to own 
and manage AttestFirm. These remaining AttestFirm partners do not become employees 
of PublicCo., although the AttestFirm has administrative and employee leasing 
agreements with PublicCo. similar to those in the traditional model. As neither the 
current nor the former partners of AttestFirm have dual employment status (i.e., they are 
not both owner-employees of AttestFirm and employees of PublicCo.), any threat of 
PublicCo. influence over AttestFirm partners would be mitigated. AttestFirm partners 
might still be influenced by PublicCo. if, in the course of performing an audit, 
PublicCo.’s interests in or relationships with an attest client were jeopardized, and 
PublicCo. could restrict access to needed employees or services - employees and services 
that possibly could not be acquired elsewhere on a timely basis. In addition, leased staff 
may influenced by their PublicCo. employment. However, it would seem that the 
employment independence of these AttestFirm partners would at least mitigate many of 
the threats to independence posed by PublicCo. relationships with AttestFirm clients.
The following describes several views put forth to apply or adapt the independence rules 
to alternative practice structures. These views were not necessarily developed with the 
primary aim of applying the existing independence rules for auditors of public companies 
to alternative practice structures. Any consensus on an appropriate application could, of 
course, contain elements of one or more of the following proposals. As in the original 
issue summary, since we are only concerned with the independence of auditors of SEC 
registrants, assume that all discussion relates to AttestFirm’s public clients.
View A
Proponents of View A would restrict virtually all PublicCo. relationships with and 
financial interests in AttestFirm clients that would be prohibited between a traditional 
firm and its audit clients. They would prohibit PublicCo. loans to AttestFirm clients, 
deposit relationships, investment advisory and broker/dealer services, ownership of 
AttestFirm client securities, bookkeeping and payroll services, receipt of contingent fees, 
etc. Although prohibiting most corporate relationships that a traditional firm could not 
have with an attest client, View A proponents have not suggested restrictions on 
PublicCo. managers’ personal investments in and relationships with AttestFirm clients.
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View A proponents have not addressed whether PublicCo. products (e.g., insurance 
policies) should be sold to AttestFirm clients.
In effect, View A proponents have “swept” PublicCo. and its subsidiaries into the 
definition of “Member,” concluding that the separation between PublicCo. and 
AttestFirm is artificial and insubstantial, but have not included any of its officers or 
employees, which differs from the approach taken by View B and View C proponents.
View B
View B proponents respect the legal separation and the measures intended to enhance the 
operational and perceived distinctness of the PublicCo. and AttestFirms in an alternative 
practice structure. However, they would impose additional restrictions of the activities 
and relationships that PublicCo. and certain of its managers could have with AttestFirm 
clients, in recognition of threats to independence posed by AttestFirm partners’ PublicCo. 
employment. They suggest that the definition of “Member” be extended to include those 
individuals in PublicCo. who directly supervise AttestFirm partners when they perform 
work on behalf of PublicCo., the managers working in offices participating in a 
significant portion of the engagement, and the entities within PublicCo. in which such 
immediate supervisors work. Because these supervisors, subsidiaries, and managers 
would now be deemed “Members” under the auditing literature, they too would be 
precluded from having financial interests, loans, direct business relationships, etc. with 
AttestFirm clients.
This lack of personal interests and relationships with AttestFirm clients might prevent 
direct supervisors from attempting to exercise control over or influencing the audit 
partners whom they supervise. These disinterested supervisors might also act as a buffer 
between audit partners and PublicCo. upper management members that may have 
personal interests in or be responsible for corporate relationships with AttestFirm clients.
In addition, proponents of this view would prohibit PublicCo., its subsidiaries, and 
individuals who indirectly supervise, indirectly control, or could be perceived as 
influencing a Member from having a material relationship with an AttestFirm client, or 
an investment that would allow the investor to exercise significant influence over the 
AttestFirm client. They define materiality with respect to the individual’s net worth and 
PublicCo.’s consolidated financial statements (but not with respect to the attest client). 
These additional individuals and entities also could not be connected with an AttestFirm 
client as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, or officer.
View B proponents would not consider the owners of one AttestFirm “Members” with 
respect to the attest clients of another AttestFirm, unless the owners of one performed 
services in another. For example, if owners of AttestFirm A performed services in 
AttestFirm B, such owners would be considered owners of both AttestFirms for purposes 
of applying the independence rules. View B proponents would not restrict the services or 
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relationships that one AttestFirm could provide to another’s attest clients, as long as the 
owners of the individual firms only provided services from within their separate firms.
View C
Others might argue that, without the liberty to change existing independence standards, 
the expanded “Member” definition suggested by View B proponents does not go far 
enough; they would say that all normally prohibited business relationships and 
investments between PublicCo. officers and management and AttestFirm clients impair 
the auditor’s independence. They point out that under the current independence rules, 
every partner is precluded from investing in or having certain business relationships with 
his or her firm’s attest clients - even if the partner resides on the opposite side of the 
country from where the attest engagement is being performed, and regardless of the 
materiality of the investment or relationship to either the partner or the client. Following 
the logic of the current rule, they would ask why even an immaterial business relationship 
between, say, the PublicCo. CEO and an AttestFirm client would not impair the auditor’s 
independence.
In addition, while the expanded definition of “Member” (View B) proponents would 
restrict the financial interests of other individuals and entities within PublicCo. that could 
have indirect control or influence over the auditor, they would allow PublicCo. entities 
and employees outside of the expanded Member group to perform services that the 
auditor would be prohibited from providing directly (e.g., bookkeeping and asset custody 
services), or enter into contingent fee arrangements with AttestFirm clients.. Proponents 
of View C say that the auditor’s employer should not be allowed to provide services to or 
have relationships with the auditor’s clients that the auditor could not provide or have 
directly, even if the auditor performs the audit under the auspices of a firm not owned by 
his employer.
View C proponents might equate the people and entities in the “Member” definition to 
PublicCo. as follows:
Personnel and Entities in the Current 
Member Definition
PublicCo. Equivalent
Firm PublicCo., its subsidiaries,1 and affiliated 
AttestFirms.3
Partners Upper management (all PublicCo. 
managers at the attest partner’s level or 
higher).2
Managerial employees in offices 
participating in a significant portion of the 
engagement.
Managerial employees in offices 
participating in a significant portion of the 
engagement.
Professional employees assigned to the 
engagement.
Professionals assigned / leased to 
participate on the engagement.
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1 Inclusion of the firm within the current definition of “Member” addresses permitted 
versus prohibited corporate financial interests, business relationships, services provided, 
etc. The current definition as applied to an accounting firm may include the entire 
worldwide firm depending on its structure / management and profit-sharing provisions, 
even though the firm may have several distinct divisions or units based on geography 
(organized by region or nation), function (audit, tax, and consulting), or profit center 
(perhaps organized by industries served). We’ve included all of PublicCo. and its 
subsidiaries in the expanded “Member” definition, to reflect the broad application of the 
rule to the traditional firm. The implied conclusion here is twofold: (1) that the auditor’s 
employer should not have relationships with or provide services to the auditor’s clients 
that the auditor could not provide directly, even if the auditor performs the audit under 
the auspices of a firm not owned by his employer, and (2) that if the current 
independence rules apply to the entire traditional firm, ignoring the separateness of 
national units and the separation between the audit and consulting practices, for example, 
then the rules should apply to PublicCo. and all of its subsidiaries.
2 The current rules specify that all partners are “Members” when determining personal 
independence restrictions, even if they are in the consulting or tax practices, and far 
removed from an attest partner’s office and profit center. The current definition captures 
the attest partner’s colleagues, direct supervisors, and all more senior people in the firm 
(colleagues include a partner at the same level or junior to the attest partner). Direct 
supervisors and more senior management are included to prevent the risk that personal 
financial interests or relationships with attest clients would enable them to exert influence 
over the attest partner (or the attest partner’s judgment would be affected, knowing senior 
management’s interests in the attest client, even without overt attempts to influence the 
attest partner). Presumably, the partner’s contemporaries and those more junior are 
included because of the collegiality that the partnership structure engenders, because of 
appearances, and perhaps even administrative ease in applying the rule.
With regard to personal investments and relationships, the solution proposed here, to 
include all PublicCo. personnel at the attest partner’s level and higher in the definition of 
“Member,” is similar to the group included in a traditional firm. In applying this rule, for 
practical purposes, PublicCo. would have to designate some minimum level of 
management as the floor for determining those included as “Members.”
3 Note that the current definition of Member would already pick up the other attest 
partners at AttestFirm that also work at PublicCo. (as well as PublicCo. personnel 
working on the engagement). The solution proposed here would also pick up attest 
partners from other AttestFirms affiliated with PublicCo. (assuming that the would fall 
within the definition of “upper management” as used here), but does not address what 
relationships AttestFirms could have with each other’s clients. If we conclude that Attest 
Firm and PublicCo. should be considered one and the same for purposes of applying the 
independence rules, then it would seem that AttestFirms, affiliated by virtue of the shared 
PublicCo. employment of their owner-managers, should not have normally prohibited 
relationships with each other’s clients. Indeed, if this were allowed, a national firm might 
5
argue that its individual offices should be allowed to have relationships with each other’s 
clients that would normally impair independence under certain circumstances - if, for 
example, partners were compensated based on office profitability rather than a firmwide, 




The proposals described thus far do not address whether restrictions on the activities of 
PublicCo. shareholders with respect to AttestFirm clients are necessary or feasible. If 
restrictions were placed on the relationships that PublicCo. senior managers could have 
with attest clients, should these restrictions extend up to PublicCo. shareholders? 
Certainly the owners of a traditional firm are subject to these restrictions.
One important distinction is that the owners of a traditional firm are, or have been, 
actively involved in its operations and management (independence restrictions extend to 
retired partners, who are receiving retirement benefits that vary based on current earnings 
as opposed to fixed benefits - these retired partners could be likened to passive 
shareholders, except that retired partners have a long history of active participation in the 
day-to-day operations of the firm, and most likely have some close ties to current 
management). Some would argue that this distinction is significant enough to justify 
leaving PublicCo. shareholders out of the “Member” definition. They would point out 
that inclusion of shareholders is not feasible, and the threat to auditor independence is not 
clear in a widely-held PublicCo., where ownership is not concentrated in any one 
individual or group. Should restrictions apply, however, to a PublicCo. shareholder that 
has a twenty or thirty percent ownership interest? Some would argue that auditor 
independence might be compromised, if such a shareholder also had, say, a significant 
interest in an AttestFirm client.
AttestFirm Client Stock Investments in PublicCo.
Another issue not yet addressed is whether restrictions are appropriate on the stock 
investments AttestFirm client has in PublicCo., a situation not covered in the current 
literature. However, loans by an attest client to the audit firm are prohibited, and it would 
seem that equity investments would be prohibited for the same reasons. The threats to 
auditor independence are twofold:
■ that the AttestFirm client, as a significant shareholder of PublicCo., could exert 
influence over an AttestFirm partner to obtain a favorable accounting treatment.
■ that the AttestFirm partner would not be objective in assessing the value of equity 
investments that were not publicly-traded, or in evaluating the need for or magnitude 
of a charge for an other-than-temporary decline in value.
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■ that an AttestFirm client’s holding of PublicCo. stock would create an unacceptable 
“mutuality of interests” between the client, PublicCo., and the AttestFirm partner.
It would seem that those who believe that PublicCo.’s financial interests in AttestFirm 
clients should be restricted would also believe that AttestFirm clients’ financial interests 
in PublicCo. should be restricted. The potential threat to auditor independence does not 
seem imposing if the client is an insignificant shareholder of PublicCo., and if the client’s 
holdings are immaterial to the client. However, materiality has not been considered in 
the current literature on direct financial interests between auditors and clients.
Commissions
Under the current rules, the acceptance of commissions by the auditor for referring attest 
clients to brokers, insurance agents, bankers, etc, is prohibited, presumably because the 
auditor could end up auditing the value or financial consequences of a product or service 
that he or she was paid to recommend. Some would argue that the AttestFirm partner’s 
independence may be impaired if he or she referred attest clients to PublicCo. for 
products, as salary increases or bonuses could be used to compensate the AttestFirm 
partner for these referrals. Others might argue, however, that it’s not the act of being 
paid for these referrals that would impair the auditor’s independence per se, but the ill- 
fated recommendation itself that causes a problem (which could be exacerbated by the 
client’s knowledge that the auditor was paid for the referral). The fact that the auditor 
advised the client might cause the auditor to be overly optimistic in auditing the results or 
consequences of that advice. Uncompensated referrals, however, are not necessarily 
prohibited.
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